This paper analyzes the effect of the business cycle on the regulatory capital buffer of German local banks in the period [1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003] 
Introduction
The role of banks in transmitting monetary shocks and the effect of banks' capitalization in this transmission process have extensively been discussed in the literature (Kishan and Opiela 2000; Van den Heuvel 2002) . In contrast, their role in transmitting GDP shocks has received only minor attention although poorly capitalized banks have the potential to amplify business cycles: poorly capitalized banks facing materializing credit risk in a business cycle downturn have basically two options to avert falling below the minimum capital requirement.
First, they could raise capital. However, this may be hard in a downturn, as external capital sources are scarce and expensive while retaining earnings may not be an option due to low returns. Second, banks can increase their capital buffer through a reduction in risk-weighted assets. However, bank-specific assets are often not marketable and/or prices are depressed during a business cycle downturn to an extent that a sale implies prohibitive losses.
Consequently, a decrease in risk-weighted assets occurs through a cut in lending. If this cut in lending is stronger than indicated by decreasing loan demand, the business cycle downturn is further amplified.
The empirical literature has taken two different approaches in testing this hypothesis. The first approach is to analyze the effect of banks' capitalization on the transmission of business cycle fluctuations on lending. Studies following this approach indeed find evidence supporting the concern that low capitalized banks are forced to cut their loan supply in a business cycle downturn (Peek and Rosengren 1995; Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004) .
The second approach is to analyze the effect of business cycle fluctuations on banks' capital buffers. Studies following this approach indeed find that capital buffers fluctuate countercyclically over the business cycle (Ayuso et al. 2004; Lindquist 2004) . Given a countercyclical materialization of credit risk, a countercyclical effect of the capital buffer may be evidence for banks' shortsightedness (Borio et al. 2001; Ayuso et al. 2004 ): banks expand their loan portfolio in a business cycle upturn without building up their capital buffers accordingly. Hence, when the business cycle downturn sets in, banks' capital buffers cannot absorb the materializing credit risks. Then, banks have to increase their capital buffers through a reduction in lending.
Both approaches have their shortcomings. The first approach does not consider the effect of business cycle fluctuations on banks' capital buffers. In contrast, the second approach explicitly models banks' capital buffers. But regressing banks' capital buffer on the business cycle cannot distinguish between banks' deliberate capital buffer decisions, i.e., supply-side effects, and demand-side effects working through loan demand. As loan demand is known to fluctuate procyclically 1 over the business cycle, demand-side effects may also lead to the countercyclical behavior of capital buffers through their effect on risk-weighted assets.
However, this countercyclical behavior of capital buffers does not correspond to shortsighted banks. Further, the second approach does not consider the effect of business cycle fluctuations on banks' loan supply.
This paper uses the second approach, but tries to circumvent these conceptual problems.
First, if one could demonstrate that banks' capitalization affects the behavior of capital buffers, this would indicate the existence of supply-side effects. 2 Hence, this paper tests for asymmetries with respect to the capitalization of banks. And second, beyond analyzing the effect of business cycle fluctuations on capital buffers, this paper analyzes what drives the detected negative effect. In order to do so, the capital buffer is decomposed into capital and risk-weighted assets, and the effect of business cycle fluctuations on both of these components is analyzed. As changes in risk-weighted assets are highly correlated with lending, changes in risk-weighted assets indicate changes in lending.
In addition, this paper studies a banking market in which a potential retreat from lending in order to build up capital buffers may be particularly harmful. In Germany, bank lending constitutes 96 percent of outside funding for non-financial firms. 3 This number reflects the fact that the German economy is dominated by small-and medium-sized enterprises (the "Mittelstand"), which have limited access to external capital markets. As the small-and medium-sized enterprises borrow mainly from local banks, this paper focuses on the behavior of public and cooperative banks. 4 Further, using one business cycle indicator for the economy as a whole may be too crude if the macroeconomic situation differs between regions. This problem is particularly consequential for local banks, which conduct their activities primarily within a limited regional area. Hence, this paper uses several business cycle indicators which are available on a state level.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical model. Section 3 is concerned with the data. Section 4 presents the results and several robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes.
1 To be clear, we refer to the term procyclical (countercyclical) in the sense of a variable that is commoving with (moving in the opposite direction of) the business cycle. We do not use the term procyclical in the sense of a variable that amplifies business cycle fluctuations. 2
While the business cycle may affect banks' capital buffers both through credit risk (supply-side effect) and through loan demand (demand-side effect), the effect of capitalization on the reaction of capital buffers to business cycles is clearly a supply-side effect (at least if the empirical methodology accounts for the endogeneity of capitalization). 3
See Bank for International Settlements (2003) . For comparison, in the US, bank lending constituted only 45 percent of outside funding for non-financial firms in 2001. 4
As we focus on local universal banks in this paper, we include all local savings and cooperative banks but exclude their head offices and specialized institutions.
The Empirical Model
As explained in the introduction, the aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of business cycle fluctuations on banks' capital buffers. This section describes the empirical model and the estimation strategy used here. First, it derives the empirical model, states the hypotheses to be tested, and describes the methodology. Second, it defines the measures of the variables of interest, banks' capital buffers and the business cycle. Third, it defines the measures and the potential impact of the bank-specific control variables.
A Partial Adjustment Model
The banking literature shows that banks have an incentive to hold a capital buffer as an insurance against violation of the regulatory minimum capital requirement (Marcus 1984; Milne and Whalley 2001; Milne 2004 ). This incentive derives from two assumptions: First, banks cannot adjust capital and risk instantaneously; otherwise they would not need to hold capital buffers. 5 And second, a violation of the regulatory minimum capital requirements triggers costly supervisory actions, possibly even leading to the bank's closure. Hence, banks stand to lose (part of) their charter value if they violate the regulatory minimum. However, raising capital is relatively costly compared to raising insured deposits. The trade-off between the cost of holding capital and the cost of failure (i.e., the charter value) determines the optimum capital buffer (Milne and Whalley 2001) .
Apart from this, the optimum capital buffer depends on the probability that the regulatory minimum will be violated and, hence, on the volatility of the capital ratio, which is mainly determined by the bank's asset risk. For traditional banks, the main determinant of asset risk is credit risk. Thus, banks with higher credit risk have higher optimum capital buffers.
The materialization of credit risk fluctuates procyclically over the business cycle. During economic upturns, loans are less likely to default than during economic downturns. However, banks are likely to take credit risks during economic upturns when banks expand their loan portfolios. Hence, forward-looking banks build up their capital buffers during economic upturns to be able to accommodate materializing credit risk during economic downturns. In contrast, shortsighted banks do not provide for credit risk during economic upturns, but have to increase their capital buffers during economic downturns (Borio et al. 2001; Ayuso et al. 2004 ).
These hypotheses are tested here using a partial adjustment framework, where banks aim at holding their respective optimum capital buffer. Hence, the specification becomes 5 Banks may not be able to instantaneously adjust capital or risk when they face adjustment costs or illiquid markets. Furthermore, under asymmetric information, capital issues could be interpreted as a negative signal with regard to the bank's value (Myers and Majluf 1984) , rendering banks unable or reluctant to react to negative capital shocks instantaneously. 
where BUF i,t ( * ,t i BUF ) is the (optimum) capital buffer of bank i at time t, α is the speed of adjustment, and u i,t is the error term.
The optimum capital buffer is not readily observable, but it depends on the business cycle due to its effect on credit risk and bank-specific variables, as suggested by the banking literature. In order to obtain the standard form of an endogenous lag model, we add BUF i,t-1 to both sides of Eq. (1). 6 Hence, the empirical model is specified as follows: 7
where CYCLE j,t is a measure of the business cycle in region j at time t, X i,t is a vector of bankspecific control variables for bank i at time t, and α α
When we estimate Eq. (2) directly, α 1 is close to unity, indicating a unit root within the data series of BUF. This is not surprising, as banks have built up their capital buffer over the observation period. The reason for this trend is likely to be the implementation of the Basel Capital Accord in Germany in 1993, which represented a negative shock to banks' capital buffers, as it raised capital requirement for most banks. Hence, in the aftermath of the implementation, banks tried to rebuild adequate capital buffers. By the end of the 1990s, the discussions on Basel II may have led to the prolongation of this positive trend.
We address this unit-root by taking first differences of the capital buffer, the business cycle, and the bank-specific variables. 8 Hence, the model we estimate is the following:
where the error term u i,t is assumed to consist of a bank-specific component µ i and white noise ε i,t . Hence, Using the same representation as used in the literature simplifies comparisons of the results. Besides, using the standard form has the advantage that my model can be estimated both with DPD for Ox (Doornik et al. 2002) Ayuso et al. (2004) . 8
We additionally scale the first difference of real GDP by lagged real GDP to obtain GDP growth rates in order to make the results comparable to the findings of the literature, which also uses GDP growth rates. Further, we do not take differences of the dummy variables, as they are meant to capture differences in the change of the capital buffer.
In contrast to the specification in levels, a negative α 2 is not to be interpreted such that the capital buffer actually decreases in business cycle upturns and increases in business cycle downturns. A negative α 2 is, rather, to be interpreted such that the increase in capital buffers, given by the positive trend in the data series, is dampened in business cycle upturns and boosted in business cycle downturns. Hence, the idea behind this specification is that the effect of business cycle fluctuations superimposes on the build-up of capital buffers.
Beyond analyzing the effect of business cycle fluctuations on capital buffers, we also analyze the driving forces of this effect. In order to be able to do so, we decompose the capital buffer into capital and risk-weighted assets and analyze the effect of business cycle fluctuations on both of these components. Hence, as CAP and RISK also show positive trends, we estimate the following two equations: 9
where CAP i,t and RISK i,t are the regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets of bank i at time t. The error terms v i,t and w i,t are again assumed to consist of a bank-specific component and white noise, with the same assumptions as for Eq. (3).
Hypotheses
Taking as the null hypothesis that business cycle fluctuations do not have an impact on the change in banks' capital buffers, we can state our hypotheses in terms of the coefficient α 2 as follows:
The capital buffer fluctuates procyclically over the business cycle: During business cycle upturns, when banks expand lending, potential risks tend to rise and banks increase their capital buffers by more than on average in order to account for these increasing risks. In business cycle downturns, when risks materialize, banks can then draw on these higher capital buffers.
H 1b : α 2 <0. The capital buffer fluctuates countercyclically over the business cycle: The negative sign can be evidence for two competing arguments. It may point to banks actively increasing their capital buffers during business cycle downturns, implying short-sightedness.
In other words, banks build up their capital buffers during business cycle upturns by less than on average, not fully accounting for increasing risks. Alternatively, a negative sign may also If H 1b cannot be rejected, we cannot directly distinguish whether demand-side effects alone are behind the negative α 2 or whether supply-side effects also drive this result. However, evidence that banks with low capital buffers increase their risk-weighted assets in a business cycle downturn by less than banks with higher capital buffers would lend support to the existence of supply-side effects. In a business cycle downturn, banks with low capital buffers may be forced to increase their capital buffers relative to banks with high capital buffers through a relative decrease of risk-weighted assets. Taking as the null hypothesis that banks with low capital buffers decrease their risk-weighted assets in a business cycle downturn by the same amount as banks with higher capital buffers, we can state our hypotheses in terms of the coefficient γ 2 as follows:
. During business cycle downturns, banks with low capital buffers increase their risk-weighted assets by less than banks with higher capital buffers: This asymmetry lends support to the claim that there are supply-side effects and, hence, that banks are shortsighted.
. During business cycle downturns, banks with low capital buffers increase their risk-weighted assets by more than banks with higher capital buffers: This asymmetry does not lend support to banks' shortsightedness. However, it still lends support to supply-side effects, yet in an unexpected way. It indicates that banks may face some restrictions on adjusting their loan portfolio, which may also be behind their low capitalization.
Methodology
Given the model in Eqs. (3)- (5), we employ dynamic panel data techniques that control for the bank-specific component of the error term. The within estimator is known to produce biased estimates when the lagged dependent variable appears as a regressor. The bias in such estimates (the "Nickell bias") is of O(1/T). Hence, its consistency depends on T being large (Nickell 1981) . As in our case, T is about 10, we cannot argue that the Nickell bias approaches zero. To avoid the Nickell bias, we opt for an instrumental variable approach. In the following, we describe the estimation procedure by using Eq. (3) as an example. Eqs. (4) and (5) are estimated using an analogous procedure.
We take the first difference of the model specified in Eq. (3) in order to eliminate the bank-specific effect µ i , and we try to find suitable instruments for
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that uses the entire set of lagged values of ∆BUF i,t as instruments. Blundell and Bond (1998) derive additional moment conditions that increase the asymptotic efficiency of the GMM estimator. Hence, we use the so-called system GMM estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) , which uses lagged differences of BUF i,t as instruments for equations in levels in addition to the Arellano-Bond instruments.
In models with endogenous regressors, using too many instruments could result in seriously biased estimates. Hence, we only use a subsample of the whole history of the series as instruments in the later cross-section. To determine the optimal lag length of the instruments, we use the procedure suggested by Andrews and Lu (2001) . We start by using the full set of moment conditions and reduce them step by step. For each set of moment conditions, we compare the Hansen test to the Hansen test of the last regression. Once the Hansen test starts to increase in significance, we stop and take the last specification, which then has the highest p-value for the Hansen test. To further reduce the problem of biased estimates, we combine the columns of the optimal instrument matrix by addition and, hence, use only one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance (Roodman 2005).
As, for our sample, the one-and two-step Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator produce quite similar estimates, we present only the (asymptotically) more efficient two-step estimates. However, the two-step estimates of the standard errors tend to be severely downward biased (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998) . To address this issue, we use the finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005) .
Measures of the Capital Buffer, Regulatory Capital, Risk-Weighted Assets, and Business Cycle Fluctuations
A bank's capital buffer is given by the capital banks hold in excess of the regulatory minimum capital requirement. Hence, we define banks' capital buffer (BUF) as the Basel capital to risk-weighted assets ratio minus the 8 percent regulatory minimum. 10
In order to estimate Eqs. (3) and (4), we decompose the capital buffer into regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets. In order to scale capital and risk-weighted assets, we define our capital variable CAP as total regulatory capital over total assets and our risk-weighted assets variable RISK as total risk-weighted assets over total assets. With respect to business cycle fluctuations (CYCLE), we use the real output gap (GAP), which isolates the business cycle from the economic trend. We calculate the output gap by subtracting a non-linear trend from real GDP using the Hoddrick-Prescott filter. As a robustness check, we also use the real GDP growth rate (GDP) as done by the literature (Ayuso et al. 2004; Lindquist 2004) . As local banks operate mainly in their own region and economic situations may differ between regions, we also calculate the real output gap (SGAP) and the real GDP growth rate (SGDP) for each German state separately. These regional variations in the business cycle also help us generalize our results, as we have only one full business cycle in our data.
Bank-Specific Control Variables
In order to estimate the effect of business cycle fluctuations on changes in banks' capital buffers, we have to control for the effect of bank-specific variables on changes in the optimum capital buffer. In the following, we present the proxy variables suggested by the banking literature and their expected impact on changes in the optimum capital buffer. The variable definitions are also given in Table A2 in the Appendix.
As raising capital through the capital markets is costly, retained earnings are frequently used to increase capital buffers. This implies that changes in profits have a positive impact on changes in the optimum capital buffer. However, a negative impact may also be conceivable: high profits may reflect high charter values and, hence, the ability to permanently generate high profits and to increase capital buffers through retained earnings. Thus, high profit banks need to hold lower capital buffers as an insurance against a probable violation of the regulatory minimum (Milne and Whalley 2001) , which translates into changes in profits having a negative impact on changes in the optimum capital buffer. Hence, we include the banks' return on assets (ROA) with an ambiguous expected sign.
Changes in asset risk may have a positive as well as a negative impact on changes in the capital buffer. Banks may have reacted to the implementation of the Basel Capital Accord in 1993 by increasing asset risk and, hence, profitability in order to compensate for having to hold more expensive capital (Koehn and Santomero 1980) . This moral hazard behavior would be reflected in changes in asset risk having a positive effect on changes in banks' capital buffers. In contrast, banks may have reacted to the implementation of the Basel Capital Accord by decreasing asset risk, as higher capital levels reduce incentives for risk-taking and higher levels of risk reduce the incentive for decreasing capital (Furlong and Keeley 1989) .
This behavior would be reflected in changes in asset risk having a negative effect on changes in banks' capital buffers. As banks make loan loss provisions against expected losses of their portfolio, we use new net provisions over total assets (LLOSS) as a proxy for risk and include LLOSS with an ambiguous expectation regarding the estimated sign. 11 Furthermore, banks' size may have an effect on the capital buffer through several channels. First, unexpected losses are in part due to asymmetric information between banks and their borrowers. Screening and monitoring reduce the asymmetry, but are costly and, thus, banks could balance the cost and gains from these activities against holding excess capital. If there are economies of scale in screening and monitoring, large banks should hold relatively less capital and instead undertake more monitoring and screening. Second, larger banks may have better investment and diversification opportunities. 12 Thus, they are subject to a lower probability of a large negative shock to their capital and only need to hold a lower capital buffer as insurance against such a shock. Third, there is a higher probability that larger banks will be bailed out by the public government in the case of financial distress, due to potential systemic effects ("Too big to fail"). Fourth, the size of a bank may be an indicator of the bank's access to capital. Savings banks as publicly owned entities and cooperative banks, which are organized as credit cooperatives, are not allowed to raise Tier 1 capital via equity markets. Hence, they depend on retained earnings and capital injections by their public owners and cooperative members, respectively. However, big public and cooperative banks may use subordinated debt issues to raise Tier 2 capital. 13 Hence, we include the natural log of total assets (SIZE) to capture size effects with an expected negative sign.
Further, banks which hold liquid assets need less insurance against a possible violation of the minimum capital requirements. Further, liquid assets have on average a non-zero riskweight. Hence, banks can increase their capital buffer by liquidating these assets and, thus, banks with more liquid assets have a lower optimum capital buffer. We use bond holdings plus share holdings plus interbank assets over total assets (LIQUID) as a proxy for liquidity and include LIQUID with an expected negative sign. 14 We also include a dummy variable to capture mergers (dyMERGER). The reason for including this variable is the ongoing merger wave within the German banking system and particularly the cooperative bank sector (Deutsche Bundesbank 2003) . The dummy variable is unity for the acquirer in the year of the merger and zero otherwise. The expected sign of the variable is negative given that acquiring banks are typically better capitalized before a merger.
Finally, we include a dummy variable in order to capture differences between public and cooperative banks. dyPUBLIC is unity if the bank is a public bank and zero otherwise (cooperative bank).
12 In principle, the argument can also run the other way around, as small and specialized banks may be in a better position to assess the quality of loans (Acharya et al. 2002) . However, public and cooperative banks are more universal than specialized banks. 13 There are 15 German public banks (7 central giro institutions and 8 local public banks) among the 50 banks with the highest number of subordinated debt issues in Basel Committee member states (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2003). 14 Ehrmann et al. (2002) argue that the particular structure of the savings and cooperative bank sector with their large interbank loans between local banks and their head offices requires to take these exposures into account. In fact, local banks can draw on these assets to shield their loan portfolio from macroeconomic shocks.
Data Description
As our results may have important implications for banks' loan supply, this paper focuses on local banks, which have traditionally played a dominant role in lending to small-and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) in Germany. SMEs form the backbone of the German economy and, in contrast to larger firms, rely heavily on bank loans. 15 Although not directly comparable with SME lending, for which data are not available, the share of public and cooperative banks in lending to non-financial firms highlights the significance of the two banking groups: At the end of 2003, the share of the public bank sector was 39 percent, the share of cooperative bank sector was 13 percent, and the share of the commercial bank sector, including the four large banks, was 44 percent.
The sample consists of all local savings and cooperative banks in west Germany. We exclude the central giro institutions from the sample, as they have a very different portfolio compared to local member banks. We also exclude the seven private savings banks (so-called free savings banks), as they are not subject to regional investment restrictions and have, hence, more degrees of freedom in deciding upon their loan portfolio. We also exclude east
German banks from the sample, as east Germany had a very different business cycle up to 2000, due to the fact that the east German economy had to catch up with the west German economy in the years following reunification and as east German banks financed a substantial part of this catching-up process.
Further, our dataset includes 288 observations with negative capital buffers. These banks may undergo transitional adjustments in accordance with the supervisory authority.
Alternatively, they may be distressed and, hence, may be under the control of the supervisory authority. In this case, they could not take deliberate investment and funding decisions. As we lack the data to discriminate between these two cases, we exclude these observations from the sample. 16 GDP data were available. However, the Hoddrick-Prescott filter, which we use to construct the output gap, is known to have a bad fit for the first and the last observation. To prevent the bad fit for the first observation, we construct our filtered GDP time-series on the basis of a longer GDP time-series back into the past. This leaves us with the bad fit for the last observation, which we drop from the sample.
The data are obtained from two different sources. The balance sheet data are kindly provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, which collects bank-level data in its prudential function.
The macroeconomic data are obtained from the German Federal Statistical Office.
Tables A3 and A4 provide descriptive statistics for the business cycle indicators and the bank-specific variables. Table A4 provides the descriptive statistics for subsamples of banks with high and low capital buffers. 17 It also contains the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which tests whether the subsamples come from the same population. 18 , The test reveals that, on average, banks with low capital buffers take higher risks, as given by higher risk-weighted assets (RISK), higher loan loss reserves (LLOSS), and a higher standard deviation of the returns on assets (ROA). However, they are not rewarded by higher returns on assets (ROA). These findings points to a possible inefficiency of banks with low capital buffers. Table A5 gives the correlation matrix. It shows that the four main business cycle indicators that are used in this paper are highly positively correlated with each other. 19 It also shows that three out of the four indicators indicate that capital buffers behave procyclically and that the fourth indicator indicates that capital buffers behave countercyclically. As will be seen below, controlling for bank-specific variables gives a more consistent picture.
Graph A1 shows the evolution of banks' capital buffers and the real output gap over the 11-year period from 1993 to 2003. First of all, Graph A1 shows that public and cooperative banks have been building up their capital buffers since the first Basel Accord was enforced in Germany in 1993. This trend in capital buffers causes a unit root in the estimation. Hence, we take first differences of the capital buffers and explain changes in capital buffers as being the result of real GDP growth rates and changes in the real output gap (as described in Section 2.1). Further, Graph A1 shows that an increase in the real output gap tends to dampen the increase in capital buffers for both well-and low-capitalized banks. This provides further evidence that capital buffers behave countercyclically over the business cycle. Additionally, Graph A1 shows that, while both banking sectors have built up capital buffers, wellcapitalized cooperative banks have consistently maintained a capital buffer above wellcapitalized public banks. This gap also widened over the observation period. Finally, Graph 1a shows that the gap between well-and low-capitalized banks also widened. 17 A bank is defined to have a low capital buffer if it is among the 5 percent least capitalized banks in its banking group for a respective year. Otherwise, it is defined as a bank with a high capital buffer. 18 Given that we primarily test financial ratios, which are typically not normally distributed, we use the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which does not dependent on the normality assumption. 19 Further, most variables are significantly correlated with each other. Most probably, this correlation stems from fixed effects, which the simple correlations do not take into account. The multivariate regression techniques, which we employ, do however account for such bank-specific fixed effects.
Regression Analysis
In the following subsections, we present the results of estimating Eqs. (3)-(5). First, we show the baseline results for Eq. (3) for the full sample, using all four main business cycle indicators, and for public and cooperative banks separately. Second, we test for asymmetries in the behavior of capital buffers with respect to economic upturns and downturns as well as with respect to the capitalization of banks. Third, we decompose the capital buffer into capital and risk-weighted assets and show the effect of the business cycle on these two components, corresponding to estimating Eqs. (4) and (5). Fourth and finally, we show further robustness checks.
Adjustments in the Capital Buffer
Columns 1-4 of Table 1 present the baseline results of estimating Eq. (3) for the full sample using our four main business cycle indicators, the Hansen test, and the tests of serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. With respect to CYCLE, we find a highly significant and negative coefficient for all of our four business cycle indicators, i.e., real GDP growth at the federal level (GDP), real GDP growth at the state level (SGDP), the real output gap at the federal level (GAP), and the real output gap at the state level (SGAP). This consistent picture indicates that capital buffers behave countercyclically and, thus, lends support to H 1b . The implied effects are, however, small: when real GDP growth increases by 1.0 percentage point, the increase in the capital buffer decreases by 0.06 percentage points.
The findings with respect to the other variables are also worth mentioning. The estimated coefficients of the lagged capital buffer confirm our dynamic specification at the five percent significance level across all indicators. As we take first differences of the variables before running the Blundell-Bond procedure, the estimated coefficient of the lagged capital buffer gives the speed of adjustment of the change in the capital buffer, which is rather fast: the estimated speeds imply that shocks to the change in the capital buffer are halved within 0.7 years.
The estimated coefficient of the return on assets (ROA) is significant and negative, implying that high-profit banks hold lower capital buffers as insurance against a probable violation of the regulatory minimum, as they can retain earnings to increase capital buffers.
The estimated coefficient of SIZE is highly significant and negative, pointing to economies of scale, diversification effects, and advantages in the access to capital. The estimated coefficient of LIQUID is significant and positive. This unexpected positive effect implies that banks with a high proportion of liquid assets in their portfolios hold higher capital buffers. As our liquidity measure includes share and bond holdings, this positive effect may be interpreted alternatively such that banks hold capital buffers in order to provide for the corresponding market risk. The estimated coefficient of LLOSS is positive and significant on the 10 percent level in two of the four specifications. The control variable for mergers (dyMERGER) yields an unexpected positive sign, implying that the acquisition boosts the capital buffers of the acquirer. A reason for the positive coefficient may be due to the construction of dyMERGER. Typically, weak savings and cooperative banks are merged with stronger, i.e., better capitalized, banks, with the larger of the two being indicated as the acquirer. Given that larger banks typically hold lower capital buffers, the coefficient of dyMERGER obtains a positive sign.
The highly significant and negative coefficient for dyPUBLIC indicates that public banks and cooperative banks differ with regard to changes in their capital buffers. Given the evidence in Graph A1, the negative dummy variable reflects the fact that the gap between the capital buffers of cooperative and public banks widens over the observation period.
Including dummy variables is the simplest way to take the heterogeneity between public and cooperative banks into account. Alternatively, the heterogeneity is likely to be also contained in the slope coefficients. Hence, in Specifications 5 and 6 in Table 1 , we split the sample into public and cooperative banks and run regressions on each of these subsamples separately. As the results for the other business cycle indicators are qualitatively the same, we only present the results for the real output gap at the federal level (GAP).
With respect to CYCLE, differentiating between public and cooperative banks reveals some interesting differences in the behavior of the capital buffer: while the capital buffers of both public and cooperative banks behave countercyclically over the business cycle, the capital buffers of public banks react more than six times stronger to the business cycle than the capital buffers of cooperative banks.
The findings with respect to the other variables are also worth mentioning. With respect to the lagged dependent variable, the results again confirm our dynamic specification at the 10 percent significance level for both public banks and cooperative banks. With respect to the other bank-specific variables, ROA, SIZE, LIQUID, and LLOSS have the same qualitative effect on capital buffers for both public and cooperative banks. However, LLOSS is found to be significant on the 10 percent level for cooperative banks only. The merger dummy variable dyMERGER is significant and positive for cooperative banks only, for which we could observe a merger wave in the period under study. ROA is defined as the return on assets ratio. SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets. LIQUID is defined as bond plus share holdings plus interbank assets over total assets. LLOSS is defined as new net loan loss provisions over total assets. dyMERGER is unity for an acquiring bank in the year before the merger and zero otherwise. dyPUBLIC is unity if the bank is a public bank and zero otherwise (cooperative bank). In order to account for the unit root of BUF, all variables are first first-differenced, before applying the Blundell-Bond procedure. Exceptions are the dummy variables and the GDP growth rates. Lagged differences of ∆BUF i are used as instruments for equations in levels, in addition to lagged levels of ∆BUF i that are used as instruments for equations in first differences. ∆ indicates the first difference. The absolute t-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively, in a two-tailed ttest. Hansen test refers to the test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) test refer to the test for the null of no first-order and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals.
Asymmetries
In this subsection, we test for two asymmetries in the reaction of capital buffers to business cycle fluctuations. First, we test whether capital buffers react differently in business cycle upturns and downturns. To do so, we define a dummy variable, dyUP, which is unity during an economic upturn, i.e., ∆GAP>0, and zero otherwise. Then, we interact the dummy variable with the output gap and one minus the dummy variable with the output gap and include both interaction terms in the regression. Thus, the two coefficients correspond to business cycle upturns and downturns, respectively.
Additionally, we decompose the capital buffer into its numerator, i.e., regulatory capital, and its denominator, i.e., risk-weighted assets. Regressing capital and risk-weighted assets on business cycle fluctuations allows direct observation of where the adjustment in the capital buffer over the business cycle comes from.
Specifications 1, 2, and 3 in Table 2 show the results for the capital buffer, capital, and risk-weighted assets for business cycle upturns and downturns separately. The previously found countercyclical effect for the capital buffers stems from business cycle downturns only.
In contrast, changes in risk-weighted assets fluctuate procyclically over the business cycle, while banks build up capital irrespective of the business cycle, but at a higher speed in downturns.
Second, we test whether banks with low capital buffers react differently to business cycle fluctuations than banks with high capital buffers. To do so, we define a dummy variable, dyLOW, which is unity if a bank is among the 5 percent least capitalized banks in its banking group for a respective year and zero otherwise. 20 The idea behind this definition is that the fact that a bank is badly capitalized compared to its peers, i.e., banks in the same banking group, may signal problems within the bank. Principally, differing risk attitudes could also be behind differing capitalizations. However, we control for banks' risk-taking by including LLOSS in the regression. Further, risk attitudes are likely to differ only to a minor extent within the public bank sector and the cooperative bank sector. Once we have defined the capitalization dummy variable, dyLOW, we interact it with the interaction terms defined in the last paragraph, as the capitalization may matter more in a business cycle downturn.
Specifications 4, 5, and 6 in Table 2contain the results for the capital buffer, capital, and risk-weighted assets separately. Specification 4 suggests an important asymmetry between low-capitalized banks and high-capitalized banks. Low-capitalized banks dampen the increase of the capital buffer while high-capitalized banks boost the build up both in up-and downturns. The reaction of high-and low-capitalized banks is stronger during downturns than upturns. Hence, the 5 percent banks with the lowest capital buffers lag further and further behind their peers over the observation period.
The results are also interesting with respect to the questions whether changes in the capital buffer over the business cycle simply reflect changes in loan demand. The finding that banks with low capital buffers increase their capital buffers by less than their peers indicates that supply-side effects also play a role in the behavior of banks' capital buffers: if capital buffers were determined by loan demand only, the capital buffers of low-capitalized banks and the capital buffers of their well-capitalized peers should both behave similarly. We test this hypothesis more directly by running regressions on the two components of the capital buffer, i.e., capital and risk-weighted assets.
The results in Specification 5 show that high-capitalized banks boost while lowcapitalized banks dampen the increase in capital both in up-and downturns. With regard to risk-weighted assets, we find in Specification°6 that high-capitalized banks boost the increase in risk-weighted assets in upturns while dampening it in downturns. In contrast, lowcapitalized banks boost the increase during upturns and downturns.
These results shed some light on the question whether the countercyclical behavior of capital buffers reflects the fact that banks are shortsighted. According to the argumentation of Ayuso et al. (2004) , banks that do not build up capital sufficiently in upturns to provide for the higher exposure to credit risk will be forced to increase buffers during downturns. Our findings show that, while low-capitalized banks indeed increase their exposure to credit risk by boosting the increase in risk-weighted assets in an upturn, they fail to boost the increase in capital correspondingly. In a business cycle downturn, however, low-capitalized banks do not manage to increase capital either. Further, they do not dampen the increase in risk-weighted assets as their well-capitalized peers do. Hence, they fail to boost the increase in capital buffers in a downturn. This lends support to H 2b , i.e., banks with low capital buffers may face barriers to adjustments. Thus, our results support the view that fluctuations in banks' capital buffers are not exclusively driven by fluctuations in loan demand over the business cycle, but also by the deliberate decisions of banks, i.e., supply-side effects. The results, however, do not support the widely held concern that banks with low capital buffers retreat from lending in order to increase their capital buffers in a business cycle downturn, thereby further aggravating the downturn. Instead, the supply-side effects show up in the unexpected behavior of lowcapitalized banks, which dampen the increase in capital buffers in a downturn. (Specifications 3 and 6) . BUF is defined as the Basel Capital Ratio minus 0.08. CAP is defined as regulatory capital over total assets. RISK is defined as risk-weighted assets over total assets. CYCLE is defined as the real output gap. ROA is defined as the return on assets ratio. SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets. LIQUID is defined as bond plus share holdings plus interbank assets over total assets. LLOSS is defined as new net loan loss provisions over total assets. dyMERGER is unity for an acquiring bank in the year before the merger and zero otherwise. dySB is unity if the bank is a savings bank and zero otherwise (cooperative bank). All variables are first first-differenced, before applying the Blundell-Bond procedure. Exceptions are the dummy variables. Lagged differences of ∆BUF (Specifications 1 and 4), ∆CAP (Specifications 2 and 5), ∆RISK (Specifications 3 and 6) are used as instruments for equations in levels, in addition to lagged levels of these variables that are used as instruments for equations in first differences. ∆ indicates the first difference. The absolute t-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively, in a two-tailed t-test. Hansen test refers to the test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) test refer to the test for the null of no first-order and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals.
Robustness Checks
For most of our specifications, the Hansen test indicates that we have used valid instruments. But for a few specifications, it rejects the chosen instruments at the 5 percent level. However, the Hansen test is well known for its tendency to overreject. Hence, we additionally run pooled OLS and fixed effects (FE) estimations including the lagged buffer as a robustness check. The reason for doing so is that simulation studies show that the OLS estimator is typically biased upwards, while the FE estimator is biased downwards in bivariate dynamic specifications (Bond 2002) . In multivariate dynamic specifications, as in our case, it is not necessarily true that the GMM estimates lie in between the OLS and FE estimates. But if both the OLS estimator and the FE estimator also give a significant and negative coefficient for CYCLE, this may nevertheless serve as an indicator of the robustness of our results. The results reported in Table A6 in the Appendix again lend support to the hypothesis that poorly capitalized banks do not reduce risk weighted assets by more during downturns than their well-capitalized peers.
So far, we have treated the bank-specific control variables as exogenous. However, they may also be endogenous. Hence, we model the bank-specific control variables as endogenous to check robustness. To do so, we include GMM-style instruments also for ROA, SIZE, LIQUID, and LLOSS in addition to the GMM-style instruments for BUF, CAP, and RISK. The results are given in Table A7 (Specifications 1-3) in the Appendix. Treating the bank-specific control variables as endogenous does not substantially change the results. In particular, the findings with respect to the interaction terms remain. Yet, the Hansen test deteriorates.
Against the background that the Hansen test of the original specification indicates that we use valid instruments, we stick with treating ROA, SIZE, LIQUID, and LLOSS as exogenous.
Last but not least, including dummy variables for the capitalization of banks creates an endogeneity problem, as the endogenous variables BUF, CAP, and RISK determine the capitalization of banks. Thus, as a robustness check, we include GMM-style instruments for the interaction terms. The results are given in Table A7 (Specifications 4-6) in the Appendix.
The interaction terms keep their significance and sign. Only the coefficient of * *(1 ) CYCLE dyUP dyLOW − becomes significant and negative on the 5 percent level in the RISK equation for cooperative banks (Specification 6). However, the Hansen test indicates that we have used invalid instruments when controlling for the endogeneity problem. Hence, we are confident in our original specification, as the endogeneity problem may not be severe enough for the Hansen test to reject the overidentifying restrictions of the original specification.
Conclusion
This paper examines how the capital buffers of German local banks fluctuate over the business cycle. We find strong evidence that capital buffers behave countercyclically, the capital buffers of public banks reacting more strongly to the business cycle than the capital buffers of cooperative banks. Further, banks with low capital buffers react differently to the business cycle than banks with relatively higher capital buffers:
Low-capitalized banks dampen the increase in capital buffers and capital while boosting risk-weighted assets during up-and downturns.
Well-capitalized banks boost capital buffers, capital and risk-weighted assets in upturns. During downturns they also boost capital buffers and capital while dampening the increase in risk-weighted assets.
These findings imply that low-capitalized banks do not catch up with their well-capitalized peers, but fall further behind over the observation period. The reasons may be manifold. One plausible explanation may be differing risk attitudes. A low capital buffer would then simply reflect banks' lower risk aversion. However, as we controlled for banks' risk-taking, this explanation is only valid if the proxy variable we used does not fully capture banks' risk attitude. An alternative explanation may be poor risk management of low-capitalized banks. However, our analysis does not allow for such conclusions. Hence, further research on this topic is clearly required.
While this issue may raise supervisory concerns, it also implies that low capitalized banks do not retreat from lending, as low capitalized banks do not decrease risk-weighted assets in a downturn. Hence, the result does not lend support to the widely held concern that banks with low capital buffers retreat from lending in order to increase their capital buffers in a business cycle downturn, thereby further aggravating the downturn. However, this conclusion is subject to the caveat that we have not directly analyzed the impact of banks' capital buffer on lending, but rather on risk-weighted assets. Hence, future research will have to model the relationship between banks' capital buffer, the business cycle, and loan supply in more detail. Notes: The dependent variable is defined differently for the different specifications as given in the respective columns. BUF is defined as the Basel Capital Ratio minus 0.08. CAP is defined as regulatory capital over total assets. RISK is defined as risk-weighted assets over total assets. GDP is defined as real GDP growth. ROA is defined as the return on assets ratio. SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets. LLOSS is defined new net loan loss provisions over total assets. LIQUID is defined as bond plus share holdings plus interbank assets over total assets. dyMERGER is unity for an acquiring bank in the year before the merger and zero otherwise. All variables are first first-differenced, before applying the pooled OLS (Specifications 1-3) and Fixed Effects (Specifications 4-6) procedure. The only exception is the merger dummy variable. ∆ indicates the first difference. The absolute t-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively, in a two-tailed t-test. 
